Sunday, November 18, 2012

Explain how your personal values fit with the values and ethics of the counselling profession, or, Musings of a foot soldier in the Happiness Army

In the following essay I will outline and clarify the extent to which my own values, principles and ethics correspond to those of professional counselling and psychotherapy. In doing so I will demonstrate how such personal and moral values dovetail with both my political convictions and my fidelity to the counselling profession. Secondly, and more controversially, I will argue that the principle of autonomy, so vital to counselling and democratic politics, has been undermined by a ‘therapeutic’ political culture that has reconceived personhood in terms of dependence and vulnerability.

I will maintain that certain values and principles, despite being consistent – in a psychotherapeutic context – with cultivating autonomy and the realisation of human potential, are, in the political sphere, antithetical to it. While this may suggest an ambivalence, on my part, towards ‘therapeutic values’ this essay is in fact as much concerned to defend those values against their misuse and corruption by political elites bereft of values of their own.

Before exploring the contrasting ways in which therapeutic values are interpreted and applied today, and the consequences for, in particular, individual autonomy and self-governance, it will be useful to provide a brief outline of the differences and continuity between the concepts of ‘values’, ‘ethics’, ‘morals’ and ‘principles’. According to Chippendale (2001), ‘Values motivate, morals and ethics constrain’. Underpinning this distinction is a characterisation of ‘values’ as our basic beliefs, as the essential drivers behind our deciding what is right or wrong, good or bad, important or unimportant. ‘Morals’ meanwhile imply judgement and the prescription of appropriate – or proscription of inappropriate – values, standards and behaviour. ‘Ethics’ represent the formalisation or systemisation of moral standards that, instead of being imposed externally, are defined in internal, organisational terms. Finally, ‘principles’ are deemed to be the fundamental or general truths that ‘inform our choice of values, morals and ethics’ (Chippendale 2001).

The British Association for Counselling & Psychotherapy (BACP), in its Ethical Framework for Good Practice in Counselling & Psychotherapy (BACP 2010: 2), summarises the relationship between values, principles and ethics as follows: ‘Values inform principles. They represent an important way of expressing a general ethical commitment that becomes more precisely defined and action-orientated when expressed as a principle.’ Thus, the moral force of a given set of ethics both depends upon and adds weight to principles that are themselves rooted in properly substantive values. It is with these themes in mind that I now turn to examine the issues arising from a consideration of my own values and those embraced and encouraged by the counselling profession.

‘Personal qualities to which counsellors and psychotherapists are strongly encouraged to aspire’, recommends the BACP, include empathy and sincerity, integrity and resilience, courage and humility (BACP 2010: 4). Such essential ‘moral’ qualities (to use the BACP’s own choice of adjective) certainly chime with my own. To that short list, I would add other commonly cherished, if similarly uncontentious, values, such as curiosity and passion, creativity and critical thinking, loyalty and dedication, honesty and dependability. Yet it is the, arguably, more contentious, multi-faceted concepts that give rise to important questions, not about the particular virtues they embody, but about the significance they hold for the relationship between psychotherapy and a therapeutic political culture.

Among these ideas, I would include equality and freedom, independence and empowerment, individuality and diversity, respect and tolerance. There is not space here to examine the specifics of all these values and principles, or their overall relevance to the counselling profession. Certainly, there is little doubt that they would all would be endorsed, accepting differences in interpretation, by the mainstream of the profession, but the two ideas I want to focus on here are among those most widely misunderstood: respect and tolerance.

The counsellor or psychotherapist (certainly in the client-centred, humanistic tradition of psychotherapy) is expected to demonstrate unconditional ‘respect’ for his or her client. This psychotherapeutic model of ‘respect’ derives, largely, from the ideas of Carl Rogers, one of the founding proponents of the humanistic approach to therapy, and for whom respect formed a key component of his concept of ‘unconditional positive regard’ (Sanders 2008: 58-64). Yet it is equally important to acknowledge that the idea of ‘respect’ can be understood very differently. In historical, cultural and broadly moral terms, to ‘respect’ someone is to hold him or her in high regard. Indeed, in certain contexts, respect implies deference (Harper n.d.). At the very least, outside its context-specific meaning in psychotherapy it is a truism that respect is something that has to be earned.

This is not a matter of semantics. Nor is it a criticism of the idea of ‘respect’ as applied in Rogerian psychotherapy, where unconditional positive regard is intimately and appropriately bound up with congruence and acceptance, empathy and openness, providing ‘an environment in which the individual can identify their own life goals and how they wish to determine them’ (Bennett 2003, Iberg 2001, Sanders 2008: 51-57 and 65-73). Nonetheless, the criteria by which politics should be judged are very different. Indeed it is the very question of judgement that is at stake here.

‘Non-judgmentalism’ is a key value in the therapeutic environment, central as it is to empathy, acceptance and congruence, and to ensuring counsellors and psychotherapists are unimpeded in ‘fostering a sense of self that is meaningful to the person(s) concerned’ (BACP 2010: 2). Yet it is singularly ill-suited to politics, where aforementioned principles like equality and freedom, independence and empowerment depend on debate and critical evaluation (both of which are principles I strongly advocate). Indeed, as Furedi (2011a) observes, ‘the precondition of a working democratic public sphere is openness to conversation and debate.’ He continues: ‘Reflecting on our differences with other points of view, letting people know where we stand and what we find disagreeable in their opinions… that is the very stuff of a vibrant democracy’ (2011a). Nonetheless, the contemporary political imagination has become estranged from making value judgements, the corollary of which is a form of non-committal relativism that has allowed for the ‘therapeutic’ turn towards non-judgmentalism.

Furedi (2003, 2010, 2011a, 2011b) has explored in detail the rise of a therapeutic culture and the ways in which non-judgmentalism has moved from the therapy room and into public life. ‘In contemporary public debate’, he notes, ‘the important connection between tolerance and judgement is in danger of being lost. The word ‘tolerance’ is now used interchangeably with the term ‘non-judgmental’ (2011a). What is becoming increasingly apparent is that non-judgmentalism, in the political sphere, has usurped the classical liberal idea of tolerance.

‘Respect’, however, is perhaps not beyond being reclaimed as a genuinely liberal principle. [T]he traditional liberal idea of tolerance’, writes Furedi (2010), ‘upholds the notion of respect – not, however, the idea of unconditional affirmation, as respect is understood today, but the liberal notion of respecting people’s potential for exercising moral autonomy.’ And it is our ‘moral autonomy’ that is diminished by a therapeutic political culture. The ‘cultivation of vulnerability’ such a culture entails is reflected in ever-expanding categories of mental illness and the increasing psychologisation of everyday life. As Black (2010) argues, such trends are indicative of a crisis of meaning ‘born of the atomisation of the social world’.

How resilience in the face of this social atomisation might be forged is beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that it is indeed resilience, in myself and others, that I hold in high esteem, as both a citizen and a counsellor. What I have sought to do here is defend therapy against (and distinguish it from) the ‘therapeutic turn’ in politics, and argue that ersatz therapeutic values in politics undermine the very autonomy counsellors seek to uphold for their clients. Included among the BACP’s appropriately robust ‘Ethical principles of counselling and psychotherapy, alongside ‘fidelity’ (trustworthiness), ‘self-respect’ (self-knowledge and self-care), ‘beneficence’ (promoting wellbeing), ‘non-maleficence’ (avoiding harm) and ‘justice’ (impartiality), is ‘autonomy’, which is neatly summarised as ‘respect for the client’s right to be self-governing’. It seems fitting, then, to end this essay by highlighting what, for me, is not merely a ‘personal value’, but rather the most important of all moral, ethical, professional and political principles (BACP 2010: 3-4).

References

BACP (2010) Ethical Framework for Good Practice in Counselling and Psychotherapy. Lutterworth: BACP Bennett, P. (2006) Abnormal and Clinical Psychology: An Introductory Textbook. Maidenhead: Open University Press Black, T. (2010) ‘Why More and More People Feel ‘Mentally Ill’’. Spiked [online] 29 July. Available from < http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/article/9356/> [25 March 2012] Chippendale, P. (2001) On Values, Ethics, Morals & Principles [online]. Available from < http://www.minessence.net/articles/Articles.aspx> [25 March 2012] Furedi, F. (2003) Therapy Culture: Cultivating Vulnerability in an Uncertain Age. Oxford: Routledge Furedi, F. (2010) ‘The Truth About Tolerance’. Spiked [online] 29 December. Available from < http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/reviewofbooks_article/10034 > [25 March 2012] Furedi, F. (2011a) ‘Don’t Blame Tolerance For This Multicultural Mess’. Spiked [online] 7 February. Available from < http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/article/10163/> [25 March 2012] Furedi, F. (2011b) On Tolerance: A Defence of Moral Independence. London: Continuum Harper, D. (n.d.) Online Etymology Dictionary [online]. Available from [25 March 2012] Iberg, J.R. (2001) ‘Unconditional Positive Regard: Constituent Activities’. In Rogers’ Therapeutic Conditions: Evolution, Theory and Practice Volume 3: Unconditional Positive Regard. ed. by Bozarth, J. and Wilkins, P. Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books, 155-171 Nolan, J. (1998) The Therapeutic State: Justifying Government at Century’s End. New York: New York University Press Sanders, P. (2008). The Person-Centred Counselling Primer. Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books Williams, J. (2003) Relativism, Social Theory and the Politics of ‘Difference’. Unpublished PhD thesis. Keele: Keele University

Saturday, September 01, 2012

CBT & TA

In what follows, I compare and contrast the main theoretical features of two approaches to counselling (or psychotherapy) that, while they share unmistakable similarities, appear to encompass markedly divergent theoretical sources: transactional analysis (TA) and cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). Firstly, I will outline the principal theoretical characteristics of each ‘school’ of therapy. I will then proceed to examine the validity of the widely held claim that TA and CBT are complementary approaches to counselling and psychotherapy. I begin by focusing on TA.

Transactional analysis was developed by Canadian-born psychiatrist Eric Berne, in the late 1950s (ITTA 2012). Also trained as a Freudian psychoanalyst, Berne parted company from the mainstream of orthodox psychoanalysis when his phenomenological commitment to advancing a theory of ‘ego states’ saw him seek ‘observable behavioural clues’ to personality (Stewart and Joines 1987: 17). ‘An ‘ego state’’, Berne wrote

may be described phenomenologically as a coherent set of feelings related to a given subject, and operationally as a set of coherent behaviour patterns; or pragmatically, as a system of feelings which motivates a related set of behaviour patterns (Berne 1961: 17).

As well as being proffered as an advanced theory of communication, child development and psychopathology, TA’s reputation also rests on its theory of personality, to which the ego-state model is key (Stewart and Joines 1987: 3). Indeed, as Berne himself insisted, ‘If you can’t break it down to ego states, it is not Transactional Analysis’ (Berne 1973: 71).

Largely as a consequence of TA’s absorption into the often reductionist ‘pop psychology’ movement of the 1960s and 70s, there remains a commonly held misconception that Berne’s P-A-C (Parent, Adult, Child) ego-state model is synonymous with Freud’s conceptualisation of superego, ego and id (Stewart and Joines 1987: 18; Harris 1967; Gildebrand 2001: 28). For Berne, however, it was essential to stress that ego-states are not ‘unobservable, theoretical states’, but ‘phenomenological realities’ (Stewart and Joines 1987: 17; Totton 2010: 13; Berne 1961: 4; Steiner 2006). Rather than ‘universal’ categories, in the sense that superego, ego and id were for Freud, ego-states are ‘eminently observable’ manifestations of the re-enactment of thoughts, feelings and behaviours originating in specific childhood experiences (Steiner 2005; Stewart and Joines 1987: 17).

According to Berne, the Child (‘archaeopsyche’) and Parent (‘exteropsyche’) ego-states ‘are fixations of early reactions and experiences or unaware internalizations.. of significant others’ (Erskine and Moursund 1988: 21). That is to say, they encapsulate thoughts, feelings and behaviours either ‘replayed from childhood’ or ‘copied from parents or parental figures’ (Stewart and Joines 1987: 12). By contrast, to be in the Adult (‘neopsyche’) ego state is to be in the ‘here and now’, seeking a balanced negotiation of ‘internal and external forces' and 'attempting to deal objectively with external reality’ (Berne 1957: 301, cited in Heathcote 2010: 258-259).

The Parent and Child ego-states are subdivided into Controlling Parent/Nurturing Parent and Adapted Child/Free Child. In turn, each of these four functional subdivisions is divided into positive and negative variants (Stewart and Joines 1987: 21-26). From this model follows the analysis of transactions between ego-states. Berne (1964: 15) defined a transaction as ‘a unit of social intercourse’, or, ‘an exchange of strokes’, where a ‘stroke’ is a ‘unit of interpersonal recognition’ (Steiner 2005). Such transactions may be ‘complementary’, wherein ‘the ego-state addressed is the one which responds’ (Adult to Adult, Parent to Child, Child to Parent, and corresponding subdivisions and variants); or it may be crossed, ‘in which the ego-state addressed is not the one which responds’ (Stewart and Joines 1987: 60, 63).

Counterproductive transactions can take the form of recurring, and self-sabotaging, patterns of communication: ‘games’. Because these games evoke emotions ‘learned’ in childhood (‘racket feelings’) they are deemed ‘maladaptive as an adult means of problem-solving’ (Stewart and Joines 1987: 6, 209). People engage in games, according to TA, to ‘further their life script’ (Stewart and Joines 1987: 244). This ‘life-script’ is understood as something akin to a self-fulfilling prophecy or ‘unconscious life plan’, formed in childhood but maintained thereafter in order to prevent re-experiencing the unmet needs and fear of abandonment present at the time of the script’s formation (Berne 1961: 123; Stewart and Joines 1987: 100, 101-102).

TA advocates behavioural diagnosis as a means by which to detect ego-states, games, and so on; it is also employed to reveal a tendency towards ‘discounting’ (‘selectively ignor[ing] information… relevant to the solution of a problem’) and ‘redefining’: misrepresenting reality to ensure it conforms to the life-script (Stewart and Joines 1987: 39, 5, 173). Similarly, ‘drivers and miniscripts’ (‘’I’m OK as long as I… am perfect, please others, etc.’’), brought into play via the negative Nurturing Parent ego-state, can be exposed as further indicators of dysfunctional, self-defeating patterns of behaviour (Stewart and Joines 1987: 164, 167).

The avowed therapeutic goal of TA is to strengthen the Adult ego state, to allow for ‘one’s full contactful capacity for engagement in meaningful relationships’ (Erskine and Moursund: 21). The extent to which this objective is consistent with that of CBT is the subject to which I now turn.

CBT is not a single therapy, but instead a generic term for at least sixteen approaches to psychotherapy (Kinsella and Garland 2008: 2; Neenan and Dryden 1999, cited in MacInnes 2003: 53). Its origins lie both in the behaviourism of Pavlov, Watson and Skinner, in the early part of the 20th century, and in the Rational Emotive Therapy (RET) pioneered by Albert Ellis in the 1950s (Rachman 1997; Sanders 2002: 22-24; Ellis 1975).

From a behaviourist perspective, human personality and behaviour – however complex – can be understood in terms of conditioning and ‘basic learning principles’ (Sanders 2002: 24). Consequently, emotional distress and behaviour disorders are ‘viewed as learnt maladaptive patterns and not as symptoms of a presumed underlying cause’ (Davies-Smith 2006: 28). For Ellis, meanwhile, the source of self-defeating behaviour lies in our ‘cognitions’: thoughts, beliefs and assumptions. This ‘cognitive principle’ can be traced to ancient Stoic philosopher Epictetus’ maxim, ‘Men are disturbed, not by things, but by the principles and notions which they form concerning things’ (Westbrook, Kennerley and Kirk 2007: 5). The subsequent synthesis of behavioural and cognitive principles arose from an understanding that behaviour is ‘crucial in maintaining – or in changing – psychological states’ (Westbrook, Kennerley and Kirk 2007: 5).

Ellis developed the A-B-C model (activating events, beliefs, emotional and behavioural consequences) to explain how irrational beliefs (B), not adverse events (A), are largely responsible for precipitating distressing emotional consequences (C) (Ellis 1962; Ross 2006). This cognitive approach was elaborated by Aaron Beck in the 1960s and 70s (Beck 1967, 1976; Beck at al. 1979). Beck identified ‘cognitive distortions’, or, ‘thinking errors’ (e.g. selective abstraction, arbitrary inference, dichotomous thinking) as the vehicles for ‘negative automatic thoughts’ (NATs). In the case of depression, these spontaneous negative cognitions are directed towards the self, the world and the future (the ‘negative triad’) and take the form of ‘hopeless and self-critical thoughts’ (Jarvis and Russell 2002: 37-38).

‘Dysfunctional assumptions’, or, ‘rules for living’ describe the second level of cognition (Kinsella and Garland 2008: 8). Often inferred from behaviour, dysfunctional assumptions are encapsulated in conditional, ‘if… then…’ statements, such as, ‘If people get to know me, then they will find out how useless I am and reject me’ (Westbrook, Kennerley and Kirk 2007: 8-10). These rigidly held assumptions may have evolved ‘in order to maintain self-esteem and a sense of safety’, and yet ‘living up to’ them, as a protective measure, will ensure that low self-esteem lies dormant at the third level of cognition: negative core beliefs (‘I am a failure’, ‘people are not to be trusted’) (Kinsella and Garland 2008: 8-9).

Through thought-challenging and behavioural experiments (to test the validity of cognitions), these maladaptive core beliefs can be modified, according to CBT, leading to a reduction in self-defeating behaviours and excessive emotional arousal (Kinsella and Garland 2008: 104). This is the goal of CBT.

Notably, despite their roots in, respectively, Freudian psychoanalysis and the behaviourist reaction to Freud, TA and CBT overlap considerably (Sanders 2002: 15; Westbrook, Kennerley and Kirk 2007: 2). Thus, by ‘playing games’, according to TA, ‘we are following outdated strategies’ (Stewart and Joines 1987: 244). This is surely comparable to the notion that dysfunctional behaviours are determined by maladaptive core beliefs. Furthermore, ‘drivers’, ‘miniscripts’, ‘redefining’ and ‘discounting’ all appear to correspond to the dysfunctional assumptions evident at the ‘second level’ of cognition, as conceptualised in CBT.

A shared orientation towards psychotherapeutic practice is also demonstrable, through the role of the contract between therapist and client, a cornerstone for both TA and CBT and their collaborative, goal-oriented approaches (Stewart and Joines 1987: 260-265; Beazley Richards 2008). That a therapeutic approach entitled cognitive behavioural transactional analysis (CBTA) has begun to emerge in recent years only confirms the continuity between the two theories (Beazley Richards 2008). Moreover, just as advocates of CBTA believe that TA should be included under the therapeutic ‘umbrella’ of ‘cognitive behavioural therapies’, Steiner (2005) argues that TA ‘is essentially a cognitive behavioural theory of personality’ (Beazley Richards 2008).

Notwithstanding its adherence to behavioural diagnosis, TA ‘retains an interest in the psychodynamic aspect of the personality’ (Steiner 2005). However, the influence of Freudian theory on CBT is less readily acknowledged. Briers (2009: 4) credits Beck with ‘giving Freud the slip’, after the latter (working as a ‘classical’ psychoanalyst) first became aware that patients were behaving in accordance with pre-conscious automatic thoughts. Yet Beck himself has noted Freud’s ongoing influence on cognitive therapy, in relation to, for instance, ‘modes of cognitive processing’ (Beck 1993: 19). We can concur with Freud – and Berne – that, in terms of the psyche, ‘a great deal occur[s] behind the scenes’ (Steiner 2005). Yet, for the purposes of this essay, we can also conclude that, just as TA remains to the fore in exposing and modifying negative core beliefs concealed by self-sabotaging life-scripts, CBT also remains centre-stage in its endeavour to strengthen the Adult ego-state.

References

Beazley Richards, J. (2008) ‘Cognitive Behavioural Transactional Analysis’ [online]. Available from: http://www.psychologytools.org/assets/files/ TA_CBTA.pdf [27 June 2012] Beck, A. T. (1967) Depression: Clinical, Experimental and Theoretical Aspects. New York: Harper & Row Beck, A. T. (1976) Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders. New York: International Universities Press Beck, A.T. (1993) ‘Cognitive Therapy: Past, Present and Future’. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology. 61(2), 194-198 Beck, A. T., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F. and Emery, G. (1979) Cognitive Therapy of Depression. New York: Guilford Press. Berne, E. (1957) ‘Ego States in Psychotherapy’. American Journal of Psychotherapy. 11(2), 293-309 Berne, E. (1961). Transactional Analysis in Psychotherapy: A Systematic Individual and Social Psychiatry. New York: Grove Press. Berne, E. (1964) Games People Play. New York: Grove Press Briers, S. (2009) Brilliant Cognitive Behavioural Therapy: How to Use CBT to Improve Your Mind and Your Life. Harlow: Pearson Education Davies-Smith, L. (2006) ‘An Introduction to Providing Cognitive Behavioural Therapy’. Nursing Times [online], 102(26), 28-30. Available from: [20 June 2012] Ellis, A. (1962) Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy. New York: Lyle Stuart Ellis, A. (1975) A New Guide to Rational Living. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Erskine, R.G. and Moursund, J.P. (1988) Integrative Psychotherapy in Action. London: Sage Gildebrand, K. (2001) ‘Transactional Analysis’. Counselling and Psychotherapy Journal. 12(5), 28-29 Harris, T. (1967) I’m OK, You’re OK. New York: Grove Press Heathcote, A. (2010) ‘Eric Berne’s Development of Ego State Theory: Where Did It All Begin and Who Influenced Him?’ Transactional Analysis Journal [online]. 40(3-4), 254-260. Available from: [19 June 2012] International Transactional Analysis Association (ITTA) (2012) ‘History of Eric Berne, Founder of Transactional Analysis’ [online]. Available from [18 June 2012[ Jarvis, M. and Russell, J. (2002) Key Ideas in Psychology. Cheltenham: Nelson Thornes Kinsella, P. and Garland, A. (2008) Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for Mental Health Workers: A Beginner’s Guide. London: Routledge MacInnes, D. (2003) ‘Evaluating an Assessment Scale of Irrational Beliefs for People with Mental Health Problems’. Nurse Researcher. 10(4), 53-67 Neenan, M. and Dryden, W. (1999) Essential Cognitive Therapy. London: Whurr Rachman, S. (1997) ‘The Evolution of Cognitive Behaviour Therapy’. In Clark, D., Fairburn, C.G. and Gelder, M.G. Science and Practice of Cognitive Behaviour Therapy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-26 Ross, W. (2006) ‘What is REBT?’ REBT Network [online]. Available from: http://www.rebtnetwork.org/whatis.html [21 June 2012] Sanders, P. (2002) First Steps in Counselling: A Students’ Companion for Basic Introductory Courses. Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Steiner, C. (2005) ‘Transactional Analysis: An Elegant Theory and Practice’. The International Transactional Analysis Association (ITAA) [online]. Available from: [18 June 2012] Steiner, C. (2006) Detailed History and Description of Transactional Analysis [online]. Available from < http://www.ericberne.com/transactional_analysis_ description.htm > [24 June 2012] Stewart, I. and Joines. V. (1989) TA Today: A New Introduction to Transactional Analysis. Nottingham: Life Space Publishing Totton, N. (2010) The Problem with the Humanistic Therapies. London: Karnac Westbrook, D., Kennerley, H. and Kirk, J. (2007) An Introduction to Cognitive Behaviour Therapy: Skills and Applications. London: Sage

Monday, March 22, 2010

Paddy McAloon - Meet the New Mozart

The transitions are a bit ropey - naff, even, but it was about time I knocked up a video for Paddy 'Prefab Sprout' McAloon's 'Meet the New Mozart':

Thursday, March 18, 2010

The 10 Best Films About Mental Illness



A Woman Under the Influence (1974)
Spider (2002)
Family Life (1971)
Clean, Shaven (1995)
An Angel at My Table (1990)
Van Gogh (1991)
Keane (2004)

Repulsion (1965)
Images (1972)
Sybil (1977)


Wednesday, March 17, 2010

Fifty Sprouts and a Desert Island



All The World Loves Lovers
Andromeda Heights
Angel Of Love
Appetite
Bonny
Cars And Girls
Cornfield Ablaze
Couldn’t Bear To Be Special
Cowboy Dreams
Cruel
Dandy of The Danube
Desire As (Acoustic)
Donna Summer
Don’t Sing
Doo Wop In Harlem
Dragons
Dublin
Earth: The Story So Far
Electric Guitars
Goodbye Lucille #1
Faron Young
Girl, I’m Here
Green Isaac
Here On The Eerie
If You Don’t Love Me (String Driven Thing)
I’m 49
I Never Play Basketball Now
I Remember That
I Trawl The Megahertz
Jesse James Bolero
Jordan: The Comeback
Last Of The Great Romantics
Life Of Surprises
Lions In My Own Garden
Meet The New Mozart
Moondog
Moving The River
Music Is A Princess
Nightingales
Pearly Gates
Rebel Land
Sleeping Rough
Sweet Gospel Music
Technique
The Ice Maiden
The Venus of The Soup Kitchen
‘Til The Cows Come Home
We Let The Stars Go
When Love Breaks Down
Wild Horses





Wednesday, March 10, 2010

www.vinylrecords.co.uk: CD SOUND: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE TRUTH

www.vinylrecords.co.uk: CD SOUND: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE TRUTH

New Waits DVD



http://www.amazon.co.uk/Tom-Waits-Under-Influence-DVD/dp/B00376AWE8/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&s=dvd&qid=1268218039&sr=1-5

Documentary examines Waits' legendary genius through exclusive interviews, rare and often previously unseen footage and contributions from many of his fellow musicians, historians and critics.

This documentary film examines, dissects and all but lobotomises the wealth of music, literature, theatre and film that have assisted in creating Waits' legendary genius and, results in hand, reviews the life and career of Tom Waits from this fascinating and rarely identified viewpoint. With exclusive interviews, rare and often previously unseen footage and contributions from; Tom's legendary producer Bones Howe; Moris Tepper and John French from Captain Beefheart's Magic Band; and occasional TW collaborator, Ken Nordine; Harry Partch associates David Dunn and Dean Drummond; BBC's head of music Chris Ingham; Beat-era scholar John Tytell plus Tom Waits historians, music academics, and respected writers. Also features numerous seldom seen photographs, much archive film and a host of other features which all at once make for an educational, inspiring and joyous celebration of Tom Waits and those he holds close to his heart.

Bonus Materials

  • Illustrated contributor biographies
  • 'John French spills the beans'; 'The World of Ken Nordine'; 'The Other Lord Buckley Live In Paris'
  • Beyond DVD gallery and more

Friday, March 05, 2010

'Appetite' - Spangle Call Lilli line

'Los Bastardos': Andrew Cox's brilliant response to my "Reflections on Beckettian 'Buddy Narratives'"

Amat Escalante's 'Los Bastardos' (2008), which I had the pleasure of seeing at the Tate Modern in December 2009, also fits into the existential ‘buddy narrative’ of films/plays like ‘Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead’ and Samuel Beckett’s ‘Waiting for Godot’. The long opening shot is of a desolate urban landscape on the outskirts of Los Angeles, and shows two wandering figures in the far background. Escalante sets the scene for the film and introduces us to the broader social predicaments of the characters, who are illegal Mexican labourers in the United States.

'Los Bastardos' opens slowly and the two main protagonists, Jesus and Fausto, don't come to the fore till at least halfway into the film. They have been contracted to kill an American woman. The woman's life is portrayed as rather drab. She lives with an uncommunicative and awkward adolescent son, with whom she can barely hold a conversation, and she seeks solace in drugs.

When Jesus and Fausto break into the woman’s home is where the narrative begins to unfold. ‘Los Bastardos’ is very similar, stylistically, to the German director, Michael Haneke’s ‘Funny Games’ (1989) - Jesus demands food from the woman and she is constantly watched over with a shotgun. Whilst Haneke’s film is very much a modern, dystopian fairy tale, with a nice family being tortured and imprisoned by two sadistic sociopaths from no particular place, Escalante portrays believable characters in Jesus and Fausto.

Jesus and Fausto are not ‘natural’ friends – Jesus is in his 30s, while Fausto is an awkward and reticent teenager. They are two people thrown together by their own social and economic deracination – neither of them can speak English; they are illegal aliens; and the very thing that has driven them to cross the US border – namely, money – is something they can only acquire in any substantial amount through killing another human being, whom they know nothing about.

The incarceration of the woman is gruesome and harrowing to follow. Though the two Mexicans are not brutal to the woman, she is still their prisoner and when she is told to strip down to her underwear to go swimming with the two Mexicans, she takes on a clown-like character and adds an ‘absurdist’ element to the drama. The woman cannot speak enough Spanish to plead or bargain with her kidnappers, and they take advantage of the woman’s home comforts such as food, swimming pool and TV while they are holding her. Escalante could be mocking passivity and consumerism when showing the kidnappers aimlessly lounging around in their victim’s home indifferent to her basic humanity, but on the other hand they could be seen as taking advantage of what little comfort is available to them both in America and their home country.

The narrative of ‘Los Bastardos’ in many ways becomes larger than the sum of its parts. Whilst a writer like Samuel Beckett was seen as hinting at the existential, philosophical alienation and deracination of post-war Europe in ‘Waiting for Godot’, Escalante’s film opens up channels of discussion about the very real human and existential void created by irrational preoccupations in the Western world with issues such as illegal immigration and the notion of the ‘economic migrant’. The United States is so determined to keep Latinos out that it is prepared to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on border security and perimeter walls. The inhuman consequences of these policies result in Latin Americans seeking even more dangerous routes, such as through desert, to get across the border leading to tragic consequences for those who perish at the cruel hands of nature.

There is no proper debate about immigration in America or Europe. The real human issues are ignored and immigration is reduced to a merely economic and technical problem – albeit, a very expensive one in terms of the social and financial expenditure required to contain it. The ingenuity of Escalante’s film is that makes us think about what is happening in front of us. He avoids endowing the film with an explicit social message, but you can’t watch and fully appreciate a film like ‘Los Bastardos’ if it doesn’t make you question why these things happen to people, and why it is wrong.

Quote of the Day

Anvil drummer Rob Reiner's response to a British lawyer who asks why heavy metal stalwarts Anvil aren't playing in front of at least 1000 punters each night: "I could answer that in one word.. two words.. three words: we haven't got good management." Priceless.

'Withnail and I' et al.: Reflections on Beckettian 'Buddy Narratives'

Two peripheral characters ponder and wander aimlessly, for want of a purposeful existence. This would be my one-line synopsis for Stoppard's wonderful Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead, but it seems to me that it might just as well describe some other cast-iron favourites of mine, whether it's Withnail and I (Withnail and Marwood), Sideways (Miles and Jack), or (with rather less wandering about), Waiting for Godot (Vladimir and Estragon).

I could wax lyrical about the sublime Sideways, and, among friends, strangers and 'friends-to-be', casual references to W & I are a kind of communicative currency, a reminder that we're all comedy fans 'in the know'. But it's the pathos and poignancy of these narratives that resonate most of all. On a personal level, I can identify with the 'not-quite-friendship' of, in particular, Marwood and Withnail (pronounced 'Withnul', as the more pedantic fans, such as myself, like to point out). It recalls more than one episode in my life. It captures that fraught realm between the love and resentment we feel towards the people we find ourselves drawn to, inexorably, but wherein, at the same time, the reality of frustrated ambitions is amplified.

And, for me, the comic catharthis and emotional punch of Withnail and I and Sideways act as a kind of imaginative bridge to and from Beckett's and Stoppard's plays and the weightier philosophical questions they embody.

Finally, not least because Rik Mayall and Adrian Edmondson co-starred in the 1991 West End production of Waiting for Godot, surely Bottom's Richard Richard and Eddie Hitler deserve a mention too? Then again, perhaps not.

Thursday, March 04, 2010

Tuesday, March 02, 2010

Dear Employer...

I am a recently qualified mental health nurse eager to pursue a career as a psychological therapist. My clinical training has provided me with the communication, assessment, teamwork and therapeutic skills vital to effective mental health interventions. Empathic, motivated and adaptable I want to enhance my strengths by gaining expertise in non-pharmacological, psychological therapies. As such, I am confident that this new, challenging career opportunity will allow me to build on my proven aptitude for establishing therapeutic relationships with clients experiencing depression, anxiety and other mental health problems.

I have experienced a variety of mental health treatment settings, including community psychiatric nursing (adult and elderly), older people’s assessment, substance misuse, neuropsychiatry, acute admissions/assessment, psychiatric triage and a mental health resource centre. Throughout my training, I worked with representatives from a range of other disciplines, professions and agencies, including social workers, occupational therapists, psychologists, general practitioners, police officers, and others.

In all of these environments I have sought to ensure that my understanding of the role of comprehensive mental health and risk assessments, research methods, evidence-based practice and the administration of psychotropic drugs have been applied in a critically reflective and self-reflective manner. A combination of clinical supervision and academic study has also given me a solid grounding on which to properly integrate theory and practice.

My training has provided me with a very good understanding of depression and anxiety, and I have also gained insights from wide-ranging work and personal experience, including: teaching in adult and higher education, working with adults with physical and learning disabilities, support work in the voluntary mental health sector, and providing long-term support to a close friend with mental health needs.

I have a good understanding of the Mental Health Act (1983), the National Service Framework for Mental Health, and the Care Programme Approach, and have paid close attention to modifications and amendments to the standards and legislation they represent. I assisted, for example, the North Staffordshire Combined Healthcare NHS Trust’s Assertive Outreach Team in its first use of a community treatment order.

During my training, as well as acquiring first-hand knowledge of psychotropic medication, I became increasingly aware of the importance of advocacy, the recovery model and psychological therapies, and am committed to incorporating these techniques and approaches into my work as a mental health practitioner.

I have acquired a working knowledge of the applications of cognitive behavioural therapy, and have taken into consideration the impact of work on mental health (in relation to low job control; understanding of employee role; organisational culture; and workplace relationships) and the need for evidence-based practice (in relation to overcoming the research-practice gap; supporting the justification for current working practices; meeting the demand for accountability; and cost-effectiveness). I look forward to further demonstrating my commitment to ongoing training and development in this field.

For my final placement I elected to be placed with the Single Point of Access nurse and social worker-led psychiatric triage team in Stoke-on-Trent. Because it provides the central point of access to mental wellbeing/psychological services in the area SPA afforded me the opportunity to gain invaluable experience in assessing people’s mental health needs, in anticipation of a career as a psychological therapist.

One example of a guided self-help CBT-type intervention I employed involved a socially isolated, self-harming young woman, with whom I developed a strong therapeutic rapport through initial and generic assessments and follow-up phone calls. The client agreed to keep a Dysfunctional Thoughts Diary, in which to record her feelings about, and reactions to, self-harming thoughts and anxiety-inducing situations. She acknowledged that my support helped her to attain the confidence to apply for voluntary work and to take part in a ‘Changes Young People 16-25 Years’ mutual help group.

Working in multidisciplinary environments has also helped me to obtain a greater practical understanding of the different pressures faced by primary and secondary healthcare services, and the need to maintain and develop links between the two. At the Single Point of Access service, for example, I was ideally placed to gain an appreciation of how depression and anxiety can present in Primary Care. Regular contact with general practitioners confirmed, in particular, that patients with depression or anxiety frequently present with physical or somatic symptoms, which can obscure a psychiatric diagnosis.

During this placement I took the opportunity to manage my own caseload, which was a responsibility I carried out with both enthusiasm and effective use of my time management skills. I also demonstrated my ability to work on my own initiative by identifying appropriate referrals, levels of assessment and suitable points of contact within other agencies.

I also enjoy and appreciate the importance of team-working, which I have found to be mutually beneficial in ensuring that essential tasks are completed effectively. I am comfortable ‘taking the lead’ when working with distressed and difficult clients, but am very much aware that effective communication between colleagues will help to ensure appropriate interventions.

I am strongly aware of the importance of client confidentiality and informed consent, and have sought to uphold NMC guidelines in this and other areas relating to standards of conduct, performance and ethics.

My clear and confident interaction with nursing and medical staff, patients, families, students and tutors, together with my record keeping and academic achievements, testify to my exemplary oral and written communication skills. These skills also ensured that I was entrusted with submitting a report regarding a professional dispute between a colleague and a member of another clinical team. Senior staff and the management team praised the report for its clear and balanced tone and used it as evidence in their attempt to settle the dispute.

I am proficient in the use of Word, PowerPoint, E-mail and the Internet. Furthermore, as well as being the Student Representative for my Diploma cohort I was selected by Keele University to attend the Florence Nightingale Foundation’s Students’ Day at St Thomas’ Hospital, in May, due to my ‘outstanding academic scores’. My postgraduate studies, which focused on debates about cultural differences and equal opportunities, together with my support for third world development charities and anti-racist campaigns, also reflect my sensitivity towards the needs and values of individuals and groups from diverse backgrounds. This is a quality that I believe could be of great benefit to your service.

Being trained in partnership with North Staffordshire Combined Healthcare NHS Trust, whose reorganisation in 2002 was driven largely by service improvement and clinical governance targets, has made me very much aware of the need to achieve tangible results in alleviating the enormous personal, social and economic costs of mental illness. And I feel strongly that my special interest in working with people suffering from depression and/or anxiety would be best served through assisting in the delivery of IAPT services.

I believe I am well-suited and well prepared to support your organisation deliver on its commitment to extending the availability of psychological therapies. I hope that therefore you will be able to look favourably upon my application.

I very much look forward to hearing from you.

So, what was that about Marx, Dr Pod?

I am a radical humanist, libertarian Marxist and anti-imperialist through and through, and yet I recognise that today's 'anti-capitalist' and environmentalist movements are backward ideological expressions of production in retreat ("Stop the World! I Wanna Get Off!"). On close inspection, the current world recession reveals the subjective retreat of the capitalist class from industrial growth*. It is therefore essential today to emphasise the need for continued economic growth, while holding to neither the sectionalism of capitalism nor the relativism of the left.

While I'm of 'Marxist extraction' I consider it a disservice to Marxism to call oneself a 'communist' or a 'socialist' today. It's axiomatic in the revolutionary Marxist tradition that communists cannot create a working class movement of their own volition. Rather it was their role was to give it conscious direction. At the present conjuncture, where the working class exists sociologically, but not politically, there is no concrete movement in society that can give expression to the abstract idea of 'social revolution' (indeed the very idea invites blank incomprehension).

Marx sought to liberate capitalism's progressive trends towards economic growth from the restrictions it places on that growth. It is because 'left', 'right' and 'centre' today are preoccupied with the destructiveness of capitalism that production (the well-spring of our humanity) and progress have been demonised, pushing social change off the agenda. The goal of surpassing capitalism has been passed over for retreating from it. Thus, to be 'radical' today is to believe that capitalism has gone 'too far', when, in reality, capitalism is unable to go 'far enough'.

The world needs development, not 'sustainable development'. The former is the pre-condition for human liberation, the latter a recipe for ensuring that majority of the world's population remains 'closer to nature' (i.e closer to death).

http://www.metamute.org/en/print/13124

(James Heartfield, 'A crisis of under-accumulation')*

Revisiting Pod v. Squeeth, in 'the Mike Leigh debate'

http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0005139/board/flat/74586739?p=3&d=148181207#148181207

Friday, September 25, 2009

Communal self sacrifice

Revisiting James Heartfield's 1996 essay, which reminded us what 'the 1980s' were really all about:

The greatest claim of the market system has always been the premium it placed on the freedom of the individual. Yet society today seems uniquely hostile to assertive individualism.

James Heartfield looks into who killed the capitalist spirit of the aggressive, self-assured individual - and why that demise is a problem for those of us who want to change society
Individualism today is in bad odour. Self-interest, self-assertion and self-reliance were once the official values of the 'free world'. Today, any expression of such values is more likely to be denounced as mere selfishness. Once, rich capitalists were the object of envy and emulation. Today they are likely to be denounced as greedy fat cats taking insensitive pay rises. There is without doubt a marked shift in the mood not just in Britain, but throughout the West.

You can judge a society's values by the kind of heroes it embraces. In the eighties the mood of triumphal individualism was caught by the revival of the forties comic book hero Superman. When Joe Shuster and Jerry Seigel first drew Superman comics he was a nerdy guy with glasses called Clark Kent. But once he stepped into a phone booth he tore open his shirt and pulled off his glasses to reveal the man of steel. In retrospect, it is difficult not to see the transformation as one from Jewish immigrant to all-American hero, as if Woody Allen had turned himself into Charles Atlas. His name translates into German as übermensch but, unlike the Nazi fantasy, this was a hero who stood up against injustice to defend the weak. When the Superman films were made, the choice of the strapping, chisel-jawed Christopher Reeve to play the part suited the American mood of standing tall in the world.

In recent months Christopher Reeve has once again become a symbol for his times. This time, however, he presents a very different kind of transformation than that from Clark Kent to Superman. Tragically, Reeve was paralysed from the neck down in a riding accident that snapped his vertebrae and damaged his spinal chord. He speaks with the aid of a microphone and a tracheotomy. He is strapped into a wheelchair. But still, remarkably, he has become a new kind of hero, for a different kind of age. Reeve was the star speaker at the opening of the Democratic Party Convention in the United States, before the president of the world's most powerful nation opened his re-election campaign. Thousands of party delegates cheered Reeve in an extraordinary outpouring of feeling for the wheelchair-bound star.

You do not have to be a cynic to ask why were they cheering? Of course, Reeve's decision to campaign for healthcare for people in his position is laudable, but it is hardly at the centre of the Democratic Party's policy agenda. Indeed, this is a party that has just committed itself to cutting back welfare benefits for single mothers. How does that sit with Reeve's crowd-pleasing claim that America does not turn its back on its needy? The truth is that the convention was cheering Reeve the symbol, not Reeve the man.

Christopher Reeve is a symbol of the values of our age. He represents the disaster that can strike us all. He represents the trans-formation of a Superman into a wheelchair-bound survivor. What the delegates cheered was somebody who had learned the hard way about his own limitations and his own fragility. He is a hero in reverse, of the kind that is all too characteristic of our times. Christopher Reeve has made the transition from the hero-worship of Ronald Reagan's America to the victim-cult of Bill Clinton's USA. Hollywood too reflects the cult of the victim as protagonist. Films of recent years feature lead characters who are autistic (Rain Man), retarded (Forrest Gump), feral (Nell) or disabled (Edward Scissorhands). Even traditional heroes are presented ironically, like Arnold Schwarzenegger's Last Action Hero.

The values that are expressed in Christopher Reeve's reception at the Demo-cratic Party Convention are quite different from the values of self-reliance and assertive individual freedom that were, until quite recently, the official ideology. Today, standing on your own two feet and insisting that you do not need to be protected or counselled is not likely to be celebrated. That is more likely to be seen as a sign of emotional illiteracy and an unwillingness to expose your weaknesses to others.

With the elevation of suffering and victim status comes a denigration of individualistic values in favour of something called 'the community'. Self-centred individualism is decried as something that belongs in the past, as a disease of the eighties. Amitai Etzioni, champion of the community and one-time speech-writer for president Clinton, puts it like this:

'The eighties was a decade in which "I" was writ large, in which the celebration of the self became a virtue. Now is the time to push back the pendulum. The times call for a reconstruction, in which we put a new emphasis on "we", on the values we share, on the spirit of community.' (The Spirit of Community, 1993, p25)

Public service is an exemplar of the spirit of community that Etzioni is hoping to rekindle. Early in his presidency Clinton delivered a speech, written by Etzioni, in which he set out his appeal to America's students to do voluntary work--as 'teachers, law enforcement officers, healthcare workers or peer counsellors'--in exchange for loans to go to college.

'There are those among us who do not believe that young Americans will answer the call to action, who believe that our young people now measure their success merely in the accumulation of material things. They believe this call to service will be unanswered but I believe they are dead wrong. The American Dream will be kept alive if you will answer the call to service.' (3 March 1993)

In fact the nay-sayers appear to have been correct. Not many people did respond to Clinton's call to service. But, as it happens, that was never really the point. The speech is a revision of the values of the American Dream. Once that meant that everyone could make it by their own efforts--by the 'accumulation of material things', in fact. Instead, today the values that politicians and commentators look for are not acquisitiveness, pride, individualism and looking after your own so much as care, duty, selflessness, diligence and modesty.

The backdrop to this kind of appeal is the premise that people have become too selfish. This has become the stock-in-trade of today's gloom-mongers. The terrible inheritance of the greedy eighties, they say, continues to haunt us. It appears that people are pursuing their self-interest at the expense of every other value in society. Love of family, care for the community, neighbourliness and civic duty all appear to have been sacrificed to selfish concerns.

Every event, from juvenile crime to boardroom pay-outs, is taken as confirmation of the same interpretation--that love of self takes precedence over any wider loyalty or altruistic concern. But, like a reflected image in a mirror, this picture is the reverse of the real movement.

What looks to many like an elevation of the individual over the interests of the community today is really something quite different. It is not that individualism has come to the fore, but that all forms of basic social solidarity have been diminished. It is not that people have turned their backs on society in wilful pursuit of their selfish concerns, only that the old collective organisations and institutions hold so little appeal that they cannot garner support and loyalty. What looks like individual self-assertiveness is in reality a disillusionment with collective organisation and a withdrawal from contemporary forms of public life.

There is a real problem here, but it is quite different from the one that is bemoaned by commentators. People have been squeezed out of public life--the diminishing numbers of people participating in political parties, trade unions, churches and all kinds of cultural organisations demonstrates as much. People's lives have as a consequence become much more individuated and privatised. But that does not mean that individuals' sense of themselves has been strengthened. Rather, individuals have become less assertive about their own interests, and have retreated defensively into private life. It would be more accurate to say that today's individualism is a weakened sense of self that is more cautious, vulnerable and self-effacing than before. But that is not the way things are generally seen today.

In Britain, as in America, the changed attitude towards individualism is expressed above all in a retrospective criticism of the excesses of the eighties. Commentators elevate the concerns of community against the foil of the 'greedy eighties', when, it is claimed, Thatcherism and Reaganism swung the pendulum too far in the direction of individual avarice. This caricature of the eighties is so enduring that it is worth briefly looking back to ask whether this really was a time when individualism was let off the leash.

In the eighties, the Conservative govern-ment's stated aim was to set the individual free from the constraints of collectivism. They saw collectivist institutions as the great plague of modern society. Trade unions, the welfare state and comprehensive schools were all bodies that were found guilty of putting the collective above the individual. Higher taxes to pay for welfare, and higher wages won by unions were all supposed to be barriers to individual entrepreneurialism. Welfare provision only led to a dependency culture, undermining individual self-reliance, they said. Collectivism, according to the Tories was choking individual freedom. The obvious remedy was to roll back the welfare state and to smash the trade unions. If that was done then the individual would be set free. At any rate that was the theory. The practice proved to be rather different.

Under Margaret Thatcher the Conservative government did attack the trade unions and their supporters. They cut state subsidies to the docks and to the steel, motor and coal industries leading to massive redundancies. They held down benefit entitlements and cut back on local authority spending. They deregulated the City of London and sold off council houses and public utilities in a programme that came to be known as popular capitalism. On the face of things they did everything they could to reduce people's dependency on the state and persuade them to stand on their own feet.

But what was the consequence of these reforms? Instead of liberating people from state regulation, the Conservatives oversaw the greatest extension of state power since 1945. State expenditure rose in real terms from £217 billion in 1979, when Margaret Thatcher was elected, to £289 billion in 1994 (adjusted to 1994 money). Regulation of industry has not decreased with privatisation, but has, if anything, increased, as once-public utilities have come under new regulatory bodies like Ofwat and Ofgas. Subsidies to local industry were not suspended, but merely redirected, as money was channelled through unelected quangos and Urban Development Corporations instead of local councils. Clientelism, rather than free enterprise, is the driving force of industry today.

The numbers of individuals dependent on state benefits rose, with millions of people in receipt of welfare payments to supplement their wages. Some five million families are currently dependent on welfare for part of their income. On top of the official unemployed figure of just over 2m must be counted a considerable proportion of the 1.5m in receipt of invalidity benefit, and the thousands studying at colleges and new universities who would have been competing for jobs but for the exponential expansion of higher education.

Any objective assessment of the 17 years of Conservative rule would have to note that the effects of the Thatcherite revolution were seriously at odds with its claims. The Tories have not liberated individuals from the constraints of welfare dependency and state regulation. On the contrary, they have comprehensively undermined people's capacity to organise their own lives and further their own interests. How could this be?

It was always an absurdity to think that it would be possible just to 'roll back' the state and reveal millions of go-getting entrepreneurs underneath. The opportunities for making something of yourself are dependent on a society that is going forward. The great advantage that capitalism used to have over its rivals was its ability to repackage the goals of amassing profits as the goals of individuals seeking their own betterment. But that strategy can only work in a dynamic society with a growing economy. A slump economy has the opposite effect, putting many people's interests more clearly at odds with the market system. Mass unemployment, degrading rates of benefit and conditions of entitlement, and shabby services are hardly the basis of a muscular individualism. More profoundly, tearing up people's collective organisations, their trade unions, their mass political parties and forcing them out of the public sphere of political engagement was a recipe for disillusionment and despair, rather than a growth of the entrepreneurial spirit. The humiliation of the working class move-ment in the eighties was bound to be a degrading experience that would undermine personal self-reliance instead of building it up.

The Conservatives' mistake was to imagine that collectivities were at the opposite end of the scale from self-reliance. They imagined, like a see-saw, that you only had to lower one end to raise the other: you only had to restrain collectivism to set the individual free. The left's view, and the view of the critics of the greedy eighties, is the mirror image of the same Tory prejudice. They too think that community and individual freedom are at odds, only they want to curtail the latter in favour of the former. In fact, the two things are much more directly related. Self-reliance, independence of purpose and organisation are not the opposite of collective organisation, but its complement. The impact of the Conservative revolution was to undermine the basic social solidarities of neighbourhood, workplace and industry. Without these simple elements of collectivity, it is inconceivable that people will be able to stand on their own two feet. Collective experience and purpose is part and parcel of self-reliance and self-assertion, not its opposite.

This is the real story of the eighties. The defeat of collective organisation and the disaggregation of basic social solidarities did not give rise to a new individualism: it was at the same time the defeat of individual self-assertion and independent organisation. In the absence of the basics of social organisation, real individuality could never flourish. Individualism and collectivism were not alternatives in the way that things are usually seen. Rather, individual initiative and self-reliance could only hope to take off in the context of a widespread sense that some sort of social solidarities were in place.

In practice the Conservatives have promoted the market at the expense of the freedom of the individual. The association of markets and freedom that is so central to Conservative ideology is false. Karl Marx made this point 150 years ago:

'Gentlemen! Do not allow yourselves to be deluded by the abstract word freedom. Whose freedom? It is not the freedom of one individual in relation to another, but the freedom of capital to crush the worker.' ('Speech on the question of free trade', 1848, Marx and Engels Collected Works, Vol6, p463)

The only freedom that the Conservatives have truly supported is the freedom of capital to crush the worker. From that standpoint, it made perfect sense to smash working class organisation and put millions out of work. The Tory champions of the capitalist class could not be expected to tell the difference between freedom and the market. In their minds the two things are synonymous. More problematic is the fact that their opponents took this propagandistic account at face value. The critics have read the eighties as a period in which there was too much freedom granted, rather than one in which freedom was aggressively curtailed in the name of the market.

The lessons of the Thatcher experiment ought to have been that the market is hostile to real freedom. The obvious conclusion would be that it is the market that we should get rid of, the better to realise true self-government. Instead the conclusion drawn today is that individuality is suspect and that freedom itself is dangerous. In these circumstances, it seems that it is the goal of individual freedom that we are being told must be sacrificed to the greater good of society and of the community. But what society and whose community are they talking about? Why should anybody subordinate the aspiration to take charge of their own destiny to the interests of a capitalist society?

Once seen in this light, the current unease over 'excessive individualism' becomes clearer. It is less the 'individual' half of the couplet 'individual freedom' that offends nineties sensibilities, but the aspiration to freedom itself. All of the denunciations of excessive individualism are not directed at people's disengagement from society, so much as at their recalcitrant belief that they have the right to decide things for themselves.

This orientation explains one of the more absurd misreadings of contemporary society--that there are too many assertive individuals around. This is far from being the case. In fact the sense of individual self-assertiveness is more precarious today than it has been for 60 years. Today's culture celebrates caution and lowered expectations rather than a brash acquisitiveness. It would be true to say that people are more individuated today, but not that they are acting more as self-confident individuals. This is not a strong sense of individuality, but rather a weak one, through which people are encouraged to see themselves as frail and in need of protection from wider society. The difference turns on the role of subjectivity envisaged.

What is meant by subjectivity is the active sense of self-government, the idea that people should aspire to decide their own fates and control their own circumstances. At the heart of the current anti-individualistic mood is a decline in the idea that subjectivity is a virtue. It is noticeable that self-obsession is seen as laudable today, so long as it is inward-looking and 'sensitive' rather than outward looking and assertive. Healthy individuals are taken to be those who invest time and energy in self-discovery, tending to their physical and psychic well-being. That individuated outlook is celebrated whereas a more aggressive expression of individual interest is frowned upon.

It should be clear that the real debate is not about the relative merits of the individual as against those of the community at all. The 'individual' is just a fall-guy. The real target is subjectivity--the aspiration to take control of affairs and try to determine your own destiny. As it happens, the 'freedom of the individual' was always a peculiarly limited concept of freedom. We were granted a moderate degree of freedom in our private lives on the basis that we foreswore any collective interest in the way that capitalist society was organised. But the present mood of anti-individualism is aimed at disparaging even that modest degree of individual autonomy.

The current climate is not a reversal of the Thatcherite project, but its extension. In the eighties collective forms of organisation were attacked for over-aggressive assertion of people's selfish interests; trade unionists were attacked for their 'I'm all-right Jack' attitude. The trade-off was supposed to be that in return for abandoning trade unions and welfare provision, people would get greater control over their personal lives, through greater property-ownership, like home-ownership and share investments. But now even that deal, one-sided as it proved to be, is being reneged upon.

Basic civil liberties, like the right to raise your family as you see fit or to drive your car where you want, are now seen as dangerously individualistic. Core conservative ideas like 'an Englishman's home is his castle' now strike prying welfare agencies as an unwarranted degree of freedom and a license for abuse within the home. Having been chased off the streets we are now being hunted down in the home as well. The individual is a target because of the lingering belief that his private life is his own, even if autonomous collective organisation is off the agenda.

Today's popular causes, like environmental protection or the anti-roads campaign, make a virtue of austerity and self-limitation. Their message is directed less against the powers that be, than against other people. Their demands are not for more resources from the authorities, but for a restriction of people's excessive consumption habits. Challenged to show where anti-roads protests had succeeded one campaigner boasted that the government's road programme had been radically slashed. This kind of protest the government can live with. They must be wishing that campaigners would lobby to reduce other areas of public expenditure as well. Why not a campaign to reduce family sizes, taking the strain off Child Benefit payments, or for that matter, another against high wages? But, then again, a demand for us all to settle for less is the logical conclusion of the protests against fat cat salaries.

More sophisticated champions of the anti-roads and anti-car protests claim that their target is not any one particular stretch of motorway, but the 'car-culture' itself. Instead of favouring the self-contained bubble of the car we should embrace public transport. The car culture, according to this argument is inherently aggressive and individualistic, while buses and trains are communal and cooperative, as well as being friendlier to the environment. The advantage of this argument is that it makes it clear that the real target of the anti-roads protests is not roads or cars as such, but a way of living, the 'car culture'. And what is offensive about this way of life is that it is, within the confines of the road network, relatively free. Theirs is a point of view that prefers timetables and queues to cruising. The idea that somebody should just go out for a drive is inconceivable to this kind of austerity politics.

The principal intellectual expression of the climate of self-effacement and limitation is the cult of 'the Other' in academic life. In literature, sociology and even law the project of 'de-centring the self' is at the top of the agenda. According to this theory the traditional Western viewpoint privileges the self over 'the Other'--no longer a Carry On film euphemism for sex, but a catch-all term for any excluded section of society, whether it be women or people of colour, or those in the post-colonial world. The very promiscuity with which the term 'Other' is applied indicates that it is not a particular grievance that is being aired. Instead, any standpoint which offers a critical vantage-point on the despised 'self' of Western discourse recommends itself in the cult of the Other.

It is pointed that these theorists do not aim to grant the excluded Other the status of equality with 'the self', but to knock the individual off of his privileged position in the dominant ideology. The goal of mutual recognition of other people as persons in their own right is an anathema to the cult of 'the Other' because that would only reproduce the centrality of the self. These theorists aim instead to 'de-centre the self', so that we all become 'the Other'. This is the project that literary critic Paul Ricouer announces in his book Oneself as Another. Last year the late Emmanual Levinas published his rewrite of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, as 'The Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Other' (see Outside the Subject, 1995). The compelling thing about these various attempts to rationalise the climate of self-effacement is their implicitly religious message: that we should subordinate ourselves to an essentially unknowable force outside of us, the Other. You could not ask for a more perfect expression of the alienated condition of modern society than that we are now all to think of ourselves as 'Others' instead of people in our own right, with our own concerns and interests.

The real tragedy of the climate of self-effacement is that it is the principle barrier to building any kind of collective solution to our problems today. For all the talk of community, nothing could be better designed to frustrate collective solutions than the prejudice that we should hold self-interest in such low esteem. It is not possible to make a commun-ity out of people without a sense of self and self-respect. Acquisitiveness, ambition and combativity will prove to be preconditions of any forceful assertion of collective interests in the future.

Any movement for social change will not come through self-effacement, but through self-assertion. It is futile to think that you could make a collective force out of individuals who were not prepared to stand on their own two feet and stick up for what they believe in. Before we can talk about the New Jerusalem to come, we need aggressive individuals in the here and now. Modesty in aspiration does not make for social harmony, but for a withdrawal from society and an increasingly privatised outlook. Agency, not self-effacement, is the basis of an association of equals. Rejecting the anti-individualism of today's moralising critics in favour of a confident sense of self is the precondition for an enduring fraternity.

Reproduced from Living Marxism issue 94, October 1996